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OSCE NATIONAL MINORITY RIGHTS IN
THE UNITED STATES: THE LIMITS OF
CONFLICT PREVENTION
Stuart Ford*
I. INTRODUCTION

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe' [OSCE] has developed dramatically since its creation
in 1975.2 For its first fifteen years, it served primarily as
a vehicle for promoting human rights and democracy in
Eastern Europe, playing a role in ending the Cold War.
Despite the collapse of communism in Europe and the
emergence of fragile democracies behind the Iron Curtain,
the emphasis on Eastern Europe has persisted because of
the outbreak of ethnic conflicts in many former Soviet bloc
states. These ethnic conflicts, of which the disintegration of
Yugoslavia is the most infamous, have made conflict prevention and management the primary goal of the OSCE in
the 1990s. Two responses to this new goal were a process
of institutionalization and the development of national minority rights. As a result, today the OSCE has at its
disposal both a body of national minority rights and a
number of implementation mechanisms designed to improve
compliance with those rights.
While the OSCE and national minority rights are certainly of relevance to ethnic tensions in Eastern Europe, there
are also groups here in the United States who would benefit from the application of OSCE national minority rights.
* Stuart Ford, J.D., LL.M., Associate, Howrey & Simon, Washington,
D.C. The author particularly wishes to thank Professor Sarah Cleveland at the
University of Texas and Dr. Nigel White at the University of Nottingham for
their support.
1. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was
originally known as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
(CSCE), until the name changed at the Budapest Summit Meeting in 1994. 34
I.L.M. 764, 773 (1995) [hereinafter Budapest Summit Declaration]. "OSCE"
will be used to refer to both phases of the organization, unless clarity requires
otherwise.
2. The OSCE process began on August 1, 1975 with the signing of the
Final Act at Helsinki. The United States was one of the original signatories.
See 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975) [hereinafter Final Act].
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This seems particularly true of Native Americans. The
OSCE's collective approach to minority rights would provide relief unavailable under other domestic or international
norms. There are two obstacles standing in the way of
Native Americans. The first obstacle is the OSCE's focus
on Eastern Europe. The second obstacle is the uncertain
legal status of OSCE commitments. Many OSCE states,
particularly the United States, have maintained that while
OSCE commitments are "politically binding," the commitments are not legally binding. Such a conclusion would
diminish the value of OSCE rights to minority groups, but
it may not eliminate that value. The commitments may still
exert some normative influence because of their political or
moral strength.
This paper will examine the OSCE to determine which
rights, principles, or implementation measures are available
to national minority groups in the United States. Part II
will begin with a brief history of the OSCE, followed by
a section on the general development of OSCE human
rights commitments. It will also present an overview of the
OSCE's current structure. Part III lays out the commitments of the OSCE applicable to minority groups, followed
by a discussion of the implementation and enforcement
mechanisms for those commitments. Part IV addresses the
question of the legal status of OSCE commitments, while
Part V looks at whether OSCE commitments have normative value even if not legally binding. Part VI addresses
the availability of OSCE minority rights in the United
States by considering the case for the application of those
rights to Native American tribes. Part VII contains a brief
conclusion.
II. HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE OSCE
A. A Brief History
Following the brinkmanship of the Cuban missile crisis,
the East and West recognized the need for a multilateral
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forum to discuss security and co-operation.' In July of
1966, the Warsaw Pact called for the "convocation of a
general European conference to discuss the questions of
ensuring security in Europe." 4 There followed a lengthy
exchange of communications between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which culminated when NATO agreed to enter
preparatory talks on the scope and procedure of the conference.' Multilateral preparatory talks resulted in the adoption of the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations, which contained the agenda an the rules of procedure for the conference.6 The agenda covered three topics:
questions relating to security; co-operation in economics,
science and technology; and co-operation on human rights.'
The most important procedural decision was the adoption
of the rule of consensus,' which would become a defining
feature of the CSCE.
The CSCE began in 1973 and ended its first round with
the signature of the Final Act of 1975' (also referred to
as the Helsinki Final Act because the conference signed
the Act there). In keeping with its pan-European nature
and the emphasis on security concerns, the forum included
all European states plus Canada and the United States,' °
and all who participated signed the Final Act with the
exception of Albania."
The Warsaw Pact wanted the CSCE in order to legitimize its hold over Eastern Europe 2 and to foster econom3. See JAN SIzoo & RUDOLF TH.
THE MADRID EXPERIENCE 24 (1984).

JURRJENS,

CSCE

DECISION-MAKING:

4. See Bucharest Declaration, quoted in SIZOO & JURRJENS, supra note 3,
at 25; see also P. van Dijk, The Final Act of Helsinki, 11 NETH. Y.B. OF
INT'L L. 97, 101 (1980).
5. See SIZOO & JURRJENS, supra note 3, at 25-32.
6. See Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations (1973), reproduced in THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE:
ANALYSIS AND BASIC DOCUMENTS 1972-1993, at 121-40 (Arie Bloed ed.,
1993) [hereinafter BASIC DOCUMENTS 1972-1993].
7. See id. at 8.
8. See Erika B. Schlager, The Procedural Framework of the CSCE: From
the Helsinki Consultations to the Paris Charter 1972-1990, 12 HUM. RTS. L.J.
221, 223 (1991).
9. See Final Act, supra note 2, at 1292.
10. See van Dijk, supra note 4, at 104. Real dialogue on the issue of European security without the participation of the all the NATO states, which included the United States and Canada, would have been impossible. See id.
11. See SIzoO & JURRIENS, supra note 3, at 77-81.
12. See van Dijk, supra note 4, at 101. The very fact that the Western
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ic and scientific exchanges with the West. NATO, on the
other hand, was interested in reducing military tension in
Europe and promoting human rights behind the Iron Curtain.13 The result was that the three agenda points of the
Conference were linked together, with the Warsaw Pact's
interest in economic co-operation tied to progress on human rights and security co-operation." This linkage was
the second defining feature of the CSCE. 5
From the beginning, the CSCE was conceived of as
more than a simple international conference. The provision
in the Final Act for a follow-up meeting marked the
CSCE as an ongoing process, the third defining feature. 6
The concluding section of the Final Act declares that
follow-up meetings will include both "a thorough exchange
of views . . . on implementation" and discussion of the
"deepening of their [the participating states'] mutual relations." 17 Thus, opportunities for new economic, scientific
and technical exchanges, desired by the Eastern European
states, would be balanced by extensive and often highly
confrontational discussions of the implementation of the
human rights provisions of the Final Act. 8 This model
was followed by the three Cold War follow-up meetings,
which took place at Belgrade (1977-1978), Madrid (19801983), and Vienna (1986-1989)." 9
The greatest achievement of the CSCE was its contribution to the collapse of communism in Europe. The Final
Act of 1975 set human rights standards2' that were

powers convened a European security conference with the states of the Warsaw
Pact effectively recognized the governments, territorial boundaries, and political
systems of the Soviet bloc. See id. This side effect did not appear in the agenda of the conference but was nonetheless an important consideration on the part
of both the East and West. See id. See FROM HELSINKI To VIENNA: BASIC
DOCUMENTS OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS 2 (Arie Bloed ed., 1990) (describing
factors that led to establishment of CSCE). This recognition was embodied in
Principle VIII of the Final Act.
13. See van Dijk, supra note 4, at 101-02.
14. See Final Act, supra note 2, at 1296.
15. See Schlager, supra note 8, at 222.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See BASIC
Final Act,
See BASIC
See BASIC

DOCUMENTS 1972-1993, supra note 6, at 9.
supra note 2, at 1325.
DOCUMENTS 1972-1993, supra note 6, at 50-51.
DOCUMENTS 1972-1993, supra note 6, at 50-59 (summarizing

Cold War follow-up meetings).
20. See infra Part II.B, notes 33-54 and accompanying text (discussing
human rights standards of Helsinki Final Act).
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adopted and publicized2 ' by human rights groups within
the communist states of Eastern Europe.' 2 These groups
pressed their governments to honor the commitments in the
Final Act and provided a constant flow of information to
the West on compliance with human rights. This information was used by the West to pressure and embarrass the
communist governments at the implementation review sessions that were central to the three Cold War follow-up
meetings.23 This has led Erika Schlager to conclude that
the CSCE "significantly

contributed

to the.

fall of

regimes." 24

[the] communist
The revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989 fundamentally
changed the nature of the CSCE. The Charter of Paris for
a New Europe,' which unanimously accepted democracy,
the inalienability of human rights, and the connection
between democracy and a market economy as the basis for
successful economic and social development, recognized the
change of nature of the CSCE in 1990.26 It seemed that

the CSCE had triumphed as a tool for remaking Eastern
Europe in a Western image, and the Charter of Paris euphorically claimed that "[T]he era of confrontation and
division of Europe has ended." 27 The process of institutionalization began in order to help the new Eastern European governments make the transition to democracy and
the free market.28 For the first time the CSCE was endowed with permanent institutions. The Charter of Paris
created a Secretariat, a Conflict Prevention Centre and an
Office for Free Elections.29
The euphoria of the Paris Summit, however, was shortlived. The outbreak of violent conflicts in Yugoslavia,

21. See infra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing importance of right
of access to information concerning CSCE process and CSCE commitments).
22. See BASIC DOCUMENTS 1972-1993, supra note 6, at 50; Schlager, supra
note 8, at 223.
23. See BASIC DOCUMENTS 1972-1993, supra note 6, at 50-59.
24. Erika B. Schlager, An Introduction to Helsinki I1, in THE CHALLENGES
OF CHANGE: THE HELSINKI SUMMIT OF THE CSCE AND ITS AFTERMATH 1, 3

(Arie
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Bloed ed., 1994).
See Charter of Paris, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 190 (1991).
See id. at 193, 195.
Id. at 193.
See Schlager, supra note 24, at 3.
See Charter of Paris, supra note 25, at 206-07 (1991).
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Nagorno-Karabakh, the Trans-Dniester and Ossetia proved
that the era of confrontation in Europe had not ended.3°
The CSCE focused on conflict prevention and management,
and this change increased the pressure to institutionalize
that resulted in the rapid acceleration of institutionalization
between the Paris Summit 1990 and the Helsinki Summit
1992.31 New structures and new implementation mechanisms proliferated. In order to better reflect the changing
nature of the process, the 1994 Budapest Summit renamed
the CSCE as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 31
B. The Development of Human Rights
The OSCE adopted the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 33 as its first
official document. Despite being a document forged out of
consensus between two antagonistic political blocs, it contains some striking language on human rights. At the heart
of the Final Act was the "Declaration on Principles GuidThese
ing Relations between the Participating States." '
Guiding Principles were considered to reflect the "interests
and aspirations" of the participating states 3' and touched
on a number of human rights issues. Principle VII stressed
the importance of "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience,
religion or belief, all without distinction as to race, sex,
language or religion." 36 In addition to this broad endorsement of human rights, the Act acknowledged that OSCE
states had a duty to respect the rights of individuals belonging to national minority groups.3 7 The OSCE states
also promised to act in accordance with the human rights
"

30. See Schlager, supra note 24, at 4-5.
31. See Dominic McGoldrick, The Development of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) After the Helsinki 1992 Conference, 42
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 411, 411 (1993).
32. See Budapest Summit Declaration, supra note 1, at 773.
33. See Final Act, supra note 2, at 1292.
34. Final Act, supra note 2, at 1293-96.
35. Final Act, supra note 2, at 1293.
36. Final Act, supra note 2, at 1295.
37. See Final Act, supra note 2, at 1295.
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provisions of both the United Nations Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.3" They agreed to
further human rights principles regarding the reunification
of families separated by the Iron Curtain39 and access to
information. '
This language perhaps seems surprising for a document
agreed to by both the Soviet Union and the United States
during the Cold War. Indeed, the force of these human
rights commitments was mitigated to some extent by Principle VIII, which stressed that "peoples always have the
right . . . to determine . . . their internal and external
political status, . . . and to pursue as they wish their
political, economic, social and cultural development." 4
This essentially made an escape clause for the Soviet bloc,
which allowed them to agree to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief, while obtaining legitimization
of their political systems. 4 Nevertheless, overall the Helsinki Final Act contained significant human rights commitments."
As noted above," the Helsinki conference was followed
by further periodic meetings. Much time at these follow-up
meetings was devoted to discussion of the implementation
of existing human rights commitments.' The follow-up
meetings also expended considerable effort exploring the
extent of the commitments made in the Final Act. The
38. See Final Act, supra note 2, at 1295.
39. See Final Act, supra note 2, at 1314.
40. See Final Act, supra note 2, at 1295, 1316 ("They [the participating
states] confirm the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and
duties in this field.").
41. Final Act, supra note 2, at 1295.
42. See supra notes 20-24 (detailing failure of escape clause due to CSCE's
contribution to collapse of communism in Eastern Europe).
43. See Thomas Buergenthal, The CSCE Rights System, 25 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 333, 335-44 (1991) (discussing human rights provisions of
Final Act).
44. See BAsIc DOCUMENTS, supra note 6, at 50-59.
45. See Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting November 4, 1986Jan. 17, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 527, 531 (1989). The document notes that
"[ain open and frank discussion was held about the application of and respect for the principles of the Final Act.
Concern was expressed about serious violations of a
number of these principles. In particular, questions relating to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
were the focus of intensive and controversial discussion."
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Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting contains:
extensive language on effective access to information,'
further language on the freedom of religions and belief,47
and language expounding the effective implementation of
the family contact and reunification principle.4" The Cold
War follow-up meetings provided important detail on how
the OSCE expected the participating states to implement
the provisions of the Final Act. They did not generate
many new human rights commitments.
The fundamental expansion of OSCE human rights commitments came at the end of the Cold War. The 1990
Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human
Dimension49 embraced a dramatic expansion of OSCE
human rights commitments. The OSCE states agreed that
free elections, representative government, the rule of law,
separation of states from political parties, the independence
of the judiciary, the right to a fair trial in criminal cases,
and a host of other "Western" ideals were essential to the
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. °
"The participating states declare[d] that the will of the
people, freely and fairly expressed through periodic and
genuine elections, is the basis of the authority and legitimacy of all government." 5 The document also contained
a number of specific pledges with respect to national minority rights.52 On the whole, the Copenhagen Document
appears revolutionary in its expansion of OSCE human
rights commitments. The undertakings of the Copenhagen
Conference were specifically endorsed in 1990 by the
heads of state of the OSCE states at the Paris Summit.53
Since then, the broad commitment to democracy, human
46. See id. at princs., para. 13, 533-34; see also id. at 545-46.
47. See id. at princs., para. 16, 534.
48. See id. at 543-45.
49. See The Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, June 29, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1305 (1990). The "Human Dimension" is a
phrase used by the OSCE to refer to the human rights aspects of OSCE
commitments. See id.
50. Id. at 1307-09.
51. Id. at 1309.
52. See id. at 1318-20; see also infra Part III.C.
53. See Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 30 I.L.M. 190, 199 (1991)
Under the heading "Guidelines for the Future," the Charter stated, "[w]e will
fully implement and build upon the provisions relating to the human dimension
of the CSCE." Id.

HeinOnline -- 23 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 8 1999-2000

1999]

OSCE NATIONAL MINORITY RIGHTS

9

rights, and the rule of law has 4been regularly confirmed
by the participating OSCE states.1
C. Structure
The OSCE structure is an ad hoc creation. The Helsinki
Final Act was the concluding document of an international
conference, not a formal treaty. 55 The concluding documents of subsequent meetings were created in the same
way. Consequently, no single document exists that sets
forth the overall structure of the OSCE.56 Instead, the
many OSCE documents, pieced together, create the OSCE
structure.
Institutionalization has mostly been a response to the
changing nature of the OSCE after the end of the Cold
War. At times, this structure has developed in an almost
haphazard way. New bodies, new positions and new mandates have been created in response to specific problems,
like the need to foster democracy in the new republics of
Eastern Europe and the need to respond to ethnic conflicts.
The rule of consensus, defined as "the absence of any
objection expressed by a Representative [of a participating
state] and submitted by him [or her] as constituting an
obstacle to the taking of the decision in question," remains
the primary feature of this structural growth. 7 Consensus
54. See generally Budapest Summit Declaration, supra note 1, at 769. The
declaration stated, "We confirm the significance of the Human Dimension in all
activities of the CSCE. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
democracy and the rule of law is an essential component of security and co-operation in the CSCE region." Id.
55. See infra Part IV.
56. See Guidelines on an OSCE Document-Charter on European Security,
Decision No. 5 of the Ministerial Council, Dec. 19, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 693, 695
(1998) (affirming commitment on part of OSCE states to "develop comprehensive and substantive OSCE Document-Charter on European Security"). It appears, however, that the OSCE is considering creating just such a document.
See id.
Though it is perhaps a bit premature to raise this point, "Document-Charter" is a name which suggests confusion about the OSCE's legal status. See id.
"Document" is a word the OSCE has used in the past to emphasize the nonlegal status of its agreements. See id. "Charter" is a word commonly associated with treaty-based constituent instruments of international organizations (e.g.,
the United Nations Charter). See id. The juxtaposition of the two words may
indicate tension or ambivalence within the OSCE about its legal status. See id.;
see also infra Part IV (discussing legal status of OSCE commitments).
57. BASIC DOCUMENTS 1972-1993, supra note 6, at 133.
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is an integral part of the OSCE, despite a number of
recent deviations." Even decisions to create structures or
powers that do not depend on consensus first require consensus.
The following comprises a description of the present
structure of the OSCE, in roughly hierarchical order.
Unless otherwise noted, all participating states sit on all
bodies, and all decision-making occurs by consensus.
Meetings of Heads of State or Government
These meetings occur every two years on the occasion
of review conferences. They "set priorities and provide
orientation at the highest political level." 59
Review Conferences
These are meetings of the permanent representatives to
the OSCE. They precede the meetings of heads of state or
government and have three tasks: to review implementation
of OSCE commitments; to consider steps to strengthen the
OSCE; and to prepare a "decision-oriented document" for
adoption by the heads of state or government.'
Ministerial Council
Formerly known as the Council of Ministers for Foreign
Affairs, it was renamed the Ministerial Council at the
Budapest Summit 1994.61 The Ministers for Foreign Affairs meets at least once a year62 and constitutes the "central decision-making and governing body" of the OSCE.63
Senior Council
Formerly known as the Committee of Senior Officials, 6'
the Senior Council meets at least twice a year to set poli-

58. See infra Part III.D.1.
59.
Declaration and Decisions From Helsinki Summit, July 10, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 1385, 1394 [hereinafter Helsinki Summit]. Cynics might suggest that
these meetings serve primarily as public relations opportunities for the Heads of
State. See id. After all, the Review Conferences will have already drafted the
document that is signed. See id.
60. Id.
61. See Budapest Summit Declaration, supra note 1, at 774.
62. See Charter of Paris, supra note 25, at 206.
63. See Helsinki Summit, supra note 59, at 1394.
64. See Budapest Summit Declaration, supra note 1, at 774.
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cy and budgetary guidelines.' The Senior Council meets
at least once a year as the Economic Forum to facilitate
dialogue on the transition to and development of free
market economies. 66
Permanent Council
Permanent representatives of the participating states comprise the permanent council and serve as the "regular body
for political consultation and decision-making." 67 The
permanent council also provides support and follow-up to
OSCE Missions.' Most of the day to day decision-making
of the OSCE occurs in weekly meetings of the Permanent
Council.'
Chairman-in Office (CIO)
This individual assumes responsibility for co-ordination of
current OSCE business. He or she also communicates the
decisions of the various Councils to OSCE institutions and
gives advice on implementing those decisions.7' Ad Hoc
Steering Groups, composed of a restricted number of
states, may be established on a case-by-case basis to assist
the Chairman-in-Office to deal with a specific issue in
conflict prevention, crisis management or dispute resolution.7"
Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC)
The Charter of Paris established the CPC in order to
reduce the risk of conflict in the OSCE area.' The CPC
created a forum to facilitate implementation of OSCE
confidence and security-building measures by operating as a
mechanism for consultation, facilitating the exchange of
military information, and maintaining a repository of ex-

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
BASIC

See Budapest Summit Declaration, supra note 1, at 774.
See Helsinki Summit, supra note 59, at 1415.
Budapest Summit Declaration, supra note 1, at 77.
See Budapest Summit Declaration, supra note 1, at 775.
See THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE:
DOCUMENTS 1993-1995, at xx (Arie Bloed ed., 1997) [hereinafter BASIC

DOCUMENTS 1993-1995].

70. See Helsinki Summit, supra note 59, at 1394.
71. See Helsinki Summit, supra note 59, at 1394.
72. See Charter of Paris, supra note 25, at 207.
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changed military information.73 The Forum for Security
Co-operation was created within the CPC in order to carry
out negotiations on new measures for arms control, disarmament, and confidence and security-building."'
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR)
The Charter of Paris created the ODIHR, formerly
known as the Office for Free Elections, to facilitate exchange of information on elections, foster implementation
of free elections, and organize seminars on election procedures and democratic institutions." The ODIHR has the
duty of organizing a meeting to review implementation of
human rights commitments in those years when a review
conference is not held.76
High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM)
The HCNM is appointed to provide "early warning" and
"early action," with regard to tensions involving national
minority issues that have the potential to develop into
conflicts affecting the peace or stability of OSCE states.77
Secretary General
The Secretary General acts under the guidance of the
CIO in order to manage OSCE structures and operations,
in particular the work of the OSCE Secretariat. He or
she advises on the financial implications of proposals before the OSCE and prepares an annual report on the operations of the OSCE for the Ministerial Council.79
Secretariat
The Secretariat,

as an administrative

organ, provides

73. See Charter of Paris, supra note 25, at 212-13.
74. See Helsinki Summit, supra note 59, 1404-05.
75. See Charter of Paris, supra note 25, at 207, 214, 220.
76. See Documents from the Prague Meeting of the Council, Jan. 30-31,
1992, 31 I.L.M. 976, 988 [hereinafter Prague Meeting].
77. See Helsinki Summit, supra note 59, at 1395; see also infra Part III. C
(discussing post of High Commissioner on National Minorities).
78. See BASIC DOCUMENTS 1972-1993, supra note 6, at 863.
79. See BASIC DOCUMENTS 1972-1993, supra note 6, at 864.
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support to the executive bodies of the OSCE. ° The Secretariat also maintains an archive of OSCE documents and
disseminates information to the public."'
Parliamentary Assembly
While the Parliamentary Assembly lies within the framework of the OSCE, it is not directly accountable to the
OSCE. 2 Delegates from parliaments in participating states
comprise the Assembly, unlike most OSCE organs, as
there is weighted representation and majority decision-making. The Parliamentary Assembly may make recommendations to the OSCE Councils. 3
Ad Hoc Seminars
A variety of ad hoc meetings of experts, seminars, and
subject-specific implementation reviews take place within
the OSCE. Some, like the human rights implementation
reviews undertaken by the ODIHR, occur regularly. The
OSCE convenes the majority of meetings in response to a
specific problem or crisis.
D. The OSCE Today
The OSCE has proceeded a long way from its beginnings in 1975. During the Cold War there existed a slow
growth and explication of OSCE human rights commitments, but no permanent structures were created. The
OSCE remained in name and practice an international
conference, albeit a more or less regular one. The fall of
the Berlin Wall initiated a period of rapid change in the
OSCE. The OSCE began the process of institutionalization
between 1990 and 1992, in order to support fledgling democracies in Eastern Europe and respond to the outbreak
of violent ethnic conflicts in former Soviet bloc countries.
Parallel to this institutionalization, a dramatic expansion of

80. See Charter of Paris, supra note 25, at 206, 211.
81. See Charter of Paris, supra note 25, at 211.
82. See Final Resolution of the Madrid Conference Concerning the Establishment of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Apr. 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1344,
1345 (1991) [hereinafter Establishment of CSCE Parliamentary Assembly].
83. See id. at 1345-47.

HeinOnline -- 23 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 13 1999-2000

14

SUFFOLK TRANSNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1

OSCE human rights commitments developed. Though the
general thrust of the expansion at established democracy
and the rule of law in the Eastern Europe states, the
ethnic nature of the conflicts developed a body of human
rights commitments and implementation mechanisms for
national minority groups. Today, the national minority
rights commitments of the OSCE must be viewed against a
background of broad human rights commitments and a
complex institutional structure.
III. NATIONAL MINORITY RIGHTS: COMMITMENTS AND
IMPLEMENTATION

A. Some Preliminary Issues
From its inception, the OSCE has recognized the existence of national minorities. Principle VII of the Helsinki
Final Act committed the OSCE states to respect human
rights and fundamental freedoms. Principle VII stated that
"[t]he participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to
such minorities to equality before the law, [and] will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of
human rights and fundamental freedoms."'
Two things are worth noting about this formulation.
First of all, national minorities have access to all of the
general human rights and fundamental freedoms of Principle VII. The phrase "human rights and fundamental freedoms" represents a term of art that refers to the human
rights conferred by OSCE documents.85 The national minorities provision of Principle VII makes it clear that
OSCE states have an obligation to extend these general
OSCE human rights to individuals belonging to national
minority groups. 6 The OSCE states, however, felt strong84. Final Act, supra note 2, at 1295.
85. Final Act, supra note 2. "The participating States will respect human
rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience,
religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." Id. The phrase is apparently borrowed from the Charter of the United
Nations. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3 (committing UN members to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms).
86. See Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the
Human Dimension, 29 I.L.M. 1305, 1318 (1990) [hereinafter Copenhagen
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ly enough about minorities to single them out for recognition as a special group. This set the stage for the development of a body of OSCE national minority rights commitments separate from the general human rights provisions.
Secondly, the wording of the national minority rights
provision of Principle VII focuses on an individual conception of minority rights. It has been suggested that most
international responses to the problem of minority rights
have adopted either an individual rights focus that implicitly favors assimilation or a quasi-collective focus that stresses the promotion of a minority identity. 7 The Final Act
extends the right of equality before the law to "persons
belonging to such minorities." Principle VII does not confer any rights on national minorities as groups. This individual rights focus is consistent with other human rights
documents adopted in the decades following WWII, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. 88
David Wippman has argued that in the last decade,
international human rights documents have undergone a
partial movement towards collective rights for minority
groups, with the OSCE leading the way.89 A perusal of
the provisions of recent OSCE documents shows a distinct
shift towards a quasi-collective focus after the end of the
Cold War.' Part III.C. will address collective rights in
more detail.

Meeting] (stating that "Persons belonging to national minorities have the right
to exercise fully and effectively their human rights and fundamental freedoms
without any discrimination and in full equality before the laws").
87. See David Wippman, The Evolution and Implementation of Minority
Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 597, 598 (1997).
88. See id. at 602-04. Wippman argues that the individual rights focus used
in human rights documents after WWII was a reaction to the perceived failure
of a quasi-collective approach used by the League of Nations after WWI. See
id. In some sense, the current trend towards collective rights is a swing back
towards the post-WWl approach. See id. at 599-601.
89. See id. at 604-09.
90. See Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 359 (noting "very significant shift"
in emphasis from individual to collective rights in Copenhagen Document).
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B. What is a National Minority Group?
Before beginning the process of identifying national
minority rights, it would be useful to have a definition of
national minority groups. The Final Act, however, does
not define national minority groups, nor in fact does the
concluding document of any OSCE meeting. This lack of
definition is not as surprising as it seems. Wippman and
others have noted that because of the controversy surrounding the issue of minority rights, few contemporary international instruments include a definition.9" Inferences about
the composition of national minority groups, however, can
be drawn from OSCE documents. The most important clue
comes from the 1991 Geneva Meeting of Experts on National Minorities, which concluded that "not all ethnic,
cultural, linguistic, or religious differences necessarily lead
to the creation of national minorities."' This statement
frames the discussion of national minority groups. It assumes that national minority groups will primarily be
defined by ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious differences, though the possession of such differences will not
automatically lead to standing as a national minority group.
The 1991 Moscow Conference on the Human Dimension
provides a second clue to the definition of national minority groups. The Moscow Conference draws a distinction
between the rights of national minority groups and the
rights of migrant workers.93 By drawing a distinction be-

91. See Wippman, supra note 87, at 597; see also Jelena Pejic, Minority
Rights in International Law, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 666, 667 (1997) (stating that
"almost a century after the creation of the first minority rights regime there is
still no definition of what is a minority under international law"). Pejic's article canvasses international law to show both the lack of a definition, and the
inherent difficulties in drafting an effective definition. See id. at 667-75.
92. Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities, July
19, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1692, 1696 (1991) [hereinafter Report on National Minorities]. Normally, a report from a meeting of experts would not create OSCE
commitments because it would not be a document formed out of the consensus
of the permanent representatives of the OSCE states. See id. The Moscow
Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, however, produced a
consensus document which specifically adopts the provisions of the 1991 Meeting of Experts. See Document of the Moscow Meeting on the Human Dimension, Emphasizing Respect for Human Rights, Pluralistic Democracy, the Rule
of Law, and Procedures for Fact-Finding, Oct. 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1670, 1686
[hereinafter Document of Moscow Meeting].
93. See Document of Moscow Meeting, supra note 92,. at 1686 ("The par-
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tween migrant workers lawfully residing in a participating
state and national minority groups, the Moscow Conference
implies that citizenship (or at least eligibility to become a
citizen) constitutes a requirement of a national minority
group.' Populations of migrant workers are not national
and are not entitled to special
minority groups'
protections provided to national minorities.
These two inferences do not greatly narrow the definition, but another source of definition exists. The High
Commissioner on National Minorities [HCNM] works with
national minority groups on a day-to-day basis and has
noted the lack of a definition of national minorities.' The
High Commissioner has argued that the "existence of a
minority is a question of fact" but nevertheless suggested a
loose definition: "First of all, a minority is a group with
linguistic, ethnic, or cultural characteristics which distinguish it from the majority. Secondly, a minority is a
group which usually not only seeks to maintain its identity
but also tries to give stronger expression to that identity."'97 The High Commissioner suggests that a distinct linguistic, ethnic, or cultural identity is crucial but that the
decision in any particular situation is fact specific. Of
course, the High Commissioner does not have the authority
to bind the OSCE states to a definition of national minority groups. Nonetheless, as the office of the HCNM has
ticipating States recognize the need to ensure that the rights of migrant workers
and their families lawfully residing in the participating States are respected").
94. See Copenhagen Meeting, supra note 86, at 1318, para. 31. The reference to "the other citizens" implies a requirement of citizenship. Cf. Wippman,
supra note 87, at n.3 (quoting definition of minorities which includes nationality as essential characteristic).
On the other hand, the High Commissioner's willingness to get involved
on behalf of the Russian community living in Estonia suggests that eligibility to
become a citizen may be grounds for status as a national minority group. See
BASIC DOCUMENTS 1993-1995, supra note 69, at 670-81 (cautioning Estonian
government against adopting strict citizenship requirements that might exclude
large numbers of Russian community).
95. See BASIC DOCUMENTS 1993-1995, supra note 69, at 650-56. In response to Albanian concerns about the fate of an Albanian minority in Greece,
the HCNM reported that Greece took the position that though Albanians
worked in Greece as migrant workers, the Greek Government did not consider
an Albanian minority to exist in Greece. See id. at 650.
96. See Factsheet of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (last
visited Nov. 27, 1998) <http://www.osce.org/inst/hcnm/fsheet/factsh.html>
(quoting from a speech of the HCNM).
97. See id.
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the most contact with national minority issues of any
OSCE institution, the High Commissioner's definition has
considerable persuasive value.
Despite the lack of a definition of national minority
groups in authoritative OSCE documents, it is certainly
possible to propose a broad definition for national minority
groups drawn from OSCE sources. Accordingly, national
minorities are groups of individuals, within an OSCE state,
who are citizens or who are eligible to become citizens
and retain a distinct ethnic, linguistic, religious, or cultural
identity.98 This is not a bright line definition, and any
decision whether or not to consider a group a national
minority will depend on the individual facts and quite
possibly on the political situation.
C. National Minority Rights
As noted in Part III.A., the Final Act's treatment of
national minorities adopted an individual rights focus, but
since the end of the Cold War, there has been an increasing shift to collective rights. Today, these two different
approaches exist simultaneously in OSCE documents. In
fact, national minority rights can be roughly categorized
into rights exercisable by the individual and duties towards
minority groups imposed upon OSCE states. Individual
rights will be discussed first.
1. Individual Rights
The individual rights tradition in the OSCE stems from
Principle VII of the Final Act, which guaranteed equality
before the law to members of national minority groups as
well as the protection of all the general human rights
provisions of the OSCE. Post Cold War documents have
further elaborated this, particularly the Copenhagen Docu98. See Charter of Paris, supra note 25, at 199 (focusing on protection and
promotion of "ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities"); Document of the Copenhagen Meeting supra note 86, at 1319 (creating duty to protect and promote ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity of national minorities). Cf. Wippman, supra note 87, at 597 (accepting that
key to national minority status is identity which "set the group apart" from
mainstream of society).
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ment. OSCE states accept that "[t]o belong to a national
minority is a matter of a person's individual choice. " 91
Further, individuals "belonging to national minorities have
the right to freely express, preserve and develop their
ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity.""
These general statements on the right of individuals to
define their own membership in a minority and preserve
their distinct identity are fleshed out with a series of more
specific rights. In particular, individuals have the right to:
speak their mother tongue in public or private; 1 establish and maintain their own educational, religious and
cultural organizations;" ° establish and maintain contact
with citizens of other states who share their cultural, religious, linguistic or ethnic identity; 3 and profess and
practice their religion, including a right of access to appropriate religious objects or materials."0 In case these
rights are insufficient to guarantee equality, OSCE states
also have undertaken to "adopt, where necessary, special
measures for the purpose of ensuring to persons belonging
to national minorities full equality with the other citizens."5 The result is that members of national minority
groups possess all the general human rights available in the
OSCE, plus a number of additional individual rights designed to aid them in preserving and developing their
minority identity.
2. Collective Rights
The Copenhagen Document also adopted significant collective rights. These collective rights take the form of
affirmative duties placed upon the OSCE states. The most
important duty reads: "The participating States will protect
the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of
national minorities on their territory and create conditions

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Copenhagen Meeting, supra note 86,
Copenhagen Meeting, supra note 86,
Copenhagen Meeting, supra note 86,
See Copenhagen Meeting, supra note
See Copenhagen Meeting, supra note
See Copenhagen Meeting, supra note
Copenhagen Meeting, supra note 86,

1318, para. 32.
at 1318, para. 12.
at 1318, para. 32.1.
86, at 1318, para. 32.2.
86, at 1318, para. 32.4.
86, at 1318, para. 32.3.
at 1318, para. 31.
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for the promotion of that identity." °6 This relates to the
right of the individual to preserve and develop his or her
own minority identity but goes much farther. States remain
under an affirmative duty to protect and promote the identity of national minority groups as a whole.
The other collective rights adopted in the Copenhagen
Document elaborate on the duty to protect and promote the
identity of national minority groups. OSCE states are under
an obligation to provide opportunities for minority groups
to be taught in their mother tongue." ° OSCE states must
respect the "effective participation in public affairs" of
national minorities."° The OSCE "unequivocally condemns . . . racial and ethnic hatred, anti-semitism, xenophobia and discrimination . . . as well as persecution on
religious and ideological grounds."" ° OSCE states also
have a duty to "take effective measures, including the
adoption . . . of such laws as may be necessary" to
prevent acts that incite violence against national minorities
as well as protect national minorities from such acts." '
In relation to the above, OSCE states also recognize the
right of interested "groups" (presumably including organizations formed to advance the cause of national minorities)
to initiate and support complaints about acts of discrimination on behalf of individuals."' States are also committed
to providing "effective remedies" for such acts of discrimination." 2 Finally, the Copenhagen Document suggests"3
106. Copenhagen Meeting, supra note 86, at 1319, para. 33.
107. See Copenhagen Meeting, supra note 86, at 1319, para. 34.
108. Copenhagen Meeting, supra note 86, at para. 35.
109. See Copenhagen Meeting, supra note 86, at 1320, para. 40.
110. Copenhagen Meeting, supra note 98, at 1320, para. 40.1, 40.2; see also
Helsinki Summit, supra note 59, at 1411. At the Helsinki Summit, the OSCE
made it clear that OSCE states "will refrain from resettling and condemn all
attempts, by the threat or use of force, to resettle persons with the aim of
changing the ethnic composition of areas within their territories." Id.
111. Copenhagen Meeting, supra note 86, at 1320, para. 40.5.
112. Copenhagen Meeting, supra note 86; see also Report of National Minorities, supra note 92, at 1697. The concept of "effective remedies" was
further developed by the Geneva Meeting of Experts on National Minorities
which calls for "a broad array of administrative and judicial remedies" to be
made available to individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis
of belonging to a national minority. Id. The document stresses the need for
protection from discrimination in respect of employment, housing and education.
See id.
113. The choice of the word "suggests" is important. While this is potentially the most far-reaching collective provision of the Copenhagen Document, it
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that the duty of promoting and protecting minority identity
would be facilitated by the creation of "appropriate local
or autonomous administrations corresponding to the specific
historical and territorial circumstances of such minorities. "I4
These rights are not generally exercisable by the individual but represent collective rights accruing to national
minority groups, which OSCE states are obliged to fulfill.
The most important minority rights commitment is that
participating states are under an affirmative obligation to
promote and protect the identity of national minority
groups. Since the Copenhagen Document, the OSCE has
produced few new national minority rights, although it has
reaffirmed the commitment to the human rights of the
previous documents.115 While substantive rights have not
been materially advanced since the Copenhagen Document,
more recent documents have developed new institutions and
mechanisms for the implementation of national minority
rights.
D. Implementation Mechanisms
National minority rights comprise a component of overall
OSCE human rights, the so-called "human dimension" of
the OSCE. As a consequence, all human dimension implementation processes remain available on issues concerning a
national minority group. General human dimension implementation processes will be discussed first. In addition, the
OSCE has a particular office devoted to national minorities, the High Commissioner on National Minorities
[HCNM]. Consequently, the operation and powers of the
HCNM will be discussed as well.
1. General Human Dimension Implementation Mechanisms
Generally, a rule of consensus characterizes the OSCE.
The creation of new OSCE commitments requires consen-

is carefully phrased as a suggestion rather than a duty. See Pejic, supra note
91, at 680-81.
114. Copenhagen Meeting, supra note 86, at 1319, para. 35.
115. See Helsinki Summit, supra note 59, at 1411.
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sus, and most implementation decisions require consensus
The rule of consensus, however, has been a
as well.
stumbling block to implementation of OSCE human rights
commitments. The dramatic growth of new human rights
commitments, and the pressing need to address the conflicts that have plagued Eastern Europe since the end of
the Cold War, have led to the creation of new mechanisms
to implement those rights, mechanisms that deviate from
the rule of consensus.
The Berlin Mechanism constituted the first significant
deviation from the rule of consensus." 6 If a participating
state feels that an emergency situation" 7 is developing in
another participating state, it may request clarification of
the matter from that state. 8 If the requesting state is
unsatisfied with the clarification, it may then request an
emergency meeting of the Senior Council. Once twelve
states have seconded the request, an emergency meeting
will be held."' The deviation from consensus, however,
only applies to the calling of the emergency meeting. Once
the meeting is convened, the normal rule of consensus
applies again."2 This mechanism allows the calling of
emergency meetings of the Senior Council in order to
discuss the violation of OSCE human rights provisions, including national minority rights. While any concrete action
requires consensus, the Berlin Mechanism provides a forum
for the frank discussion of violations.
The Moscow Mechanism applies only to issues relating
to OSCE's human rights commitments.' 2 ' Any state may
invite a mission of experts to gather information on a
human rights issue and to "use its good offices and media116. See Berlin Meeting of the CSCE Council, June 19-20, 1991, Annex 2,
30 I.L.M. 1348, 1353-55 [hereinafter Berlin Meeting].
117. See id. at 1353. An emergency situation is characterized as potentially
arising from the violation of the Principles of the Final Act. See id. Since
Principle VII covers human rights, a violation of OSCE human rights
provisions can constitute an emergency situation that would justify the invocation of the Berlin Mechanism. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.at 1354.
120. See id. at 1355. Presumably the consensus rule at the emergency meeting would be subject to Consensus Minus One, an implementation mechanism
developed later in time than the Berlin Mechanism. See infra notes 126-28 and
accompanying text.
121. See Document of Moscow Meeting, supra note 92, at 1674-76.
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tion services."" If a state, however, requests that another state invite a mission of experts and that request is declined, or a state feels that a question has not been
resolved by a mission of experts, then it may request the
establishment of a mission of rapporteurs.'23 If five other
OSCE states concur, then the rapporteurs are sent, and the
recipient state becomes bound to accept them and provide
the access they need to carry out their mission.24 The
rapporteurs have the power to establish the facts and may
give advice on possible solutions." 2 The Moscow Mechanism creates a compulsory fact-finding capacity for the
OSCE on human rights issues. The mechanism has no
power to compel a solution, but it does provide for an
investigation and the presentation of the results to the
Senior Council of the OSCE for frank discussion.
Consensus Minus One allows the Ministerial or Senior
Council to take "political steps" or make "political declarations" in cases of "clear, gross, and uncorrected" violations of OSCE commitments without the consent of the
state concerned.' 26 Consensus Minus One was used in
1992 against Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), when
the Senior Council condemned Yugoslavia for its part in
the Bosnian crisis (a political declaration) and organized
Sanction Assistance Missions to co-ordinate OSCE states'
compliance with UN sanctions against Yugoslavia (a political step). 27 No power exists to compel compliance by
the offending state, but the ability to take political steps
and make political declarations gives the OSCE the authority to condemn violations by OSCE states and co-ordinate a
response. The force of international condemnation should
28
not be underestimated.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Document of Moscow Meeting, supra note 92,
See Document of Moscow Meeting, supra note
See Document of Moscow Meeting, supra note
See Document of Moscow Meeting, supra note
Prague Meeting, supra note 76, at 989-90.
See McGoldrick, supra note 31, at 413-14.
See Wippman, supra note 87, at 616.

at 1674.
92, at 1675.
92, at 1675.
92, at 1676.
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2. The High Commissioner on National Minorities
The post of High Commissioner on National Minorities
[HCNM] is focused on the situation of national minorities. 129 The mandate of the HCNM is to provide "early
warning" and "early action" with regard to "tensions involving national minority issues" that have the "potential to
develop into a conflict . . . affecting peace, stability, or
relations between participating States . .
".."130
The High
Commissioner intervenes at the stage of state-minority
tensions. Once actual conflict breaks out the role of the
High Commissioner is diminished as the OSCE's other
bodies take over.' 3 ' As the language of the mandate suggests, the High Commissioner does not represent an express advocate of national minority rights; rather the post
is designed as "an instrument of conflict prevention. 132
Nevertheless, in order to provide early warning and early
action, the High Commissioner deals directly and primarily
with national minority issues, which perforce include the
implementation of national minority rights.' 33
The High Commissioner is empowered to collect and
receive information on national minority issues from any
source 34 except organizations that practice or condone
terrorism. 13
When
combined
with
the
High
36
Commissioner's independence from OSCE states,'
this
gives the HCNM broad investigative ability. In addition,

129. See generally Maria Amor Martin Estebanez, The High Commissioner on
National Minorities: Development of the Mandate, in THE OSCE IN THE
MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY 123 (Michael Bothe et al. eds., 1997)
(describing post of High Commissioner).
130. Helsinki Summit, supra note 59, at 1396.
131. See Estebanez, supra note 129, at 127.
132. Helsinki Summit, supra note 59, at 1396; See also Estebanez, supra
note 129, at 125-26, 127 (characterizing requirement that tensions between
OSCE states may develop into potential conflicts as "main substantive delimitation" on post of High Commissioner).
133. See Helsinki Summit, supra note 59, at 1396 (stating High Commissioner deals with rights of groups, not individuals); But see Estebanez, supra note
129, at 129 (discussing Commissioner's investigations against individuals where
violations affected group as whole).
134. See Helsinki Summit, supra note 59, at 1397. The media and non-governmental organizations are listed as non-exclusive examples of information
sources. See id.
135. See Helsinki Summit, supra note 59, at 1398.
136. See Helsinki Summit, supra note 59, at 1396.
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the Commissioner has the power to travel within OSCE
states in order to communicate first-hand with parties to
the situation.137 The term "parties to the situation" includes OSCE states but also includes "religious and other
groups of national minorities directly concerned." 138 Thus,
the High Commissioner has a mandate to consult directly
with national minority groups.'39 Finally, the HCNM may
employ experts to assist on matters that require "specialized investigation.'" Consequently, the HCNM has broad
powers, including collecting and receiving information,
traveling freely to consult first-hand with national minority
groups, and utilizing experts. In addition, the High Commissioner has adopted the practice of exchanging correspondence with states experiencing visits. These letters "permit
the methodical spelling out of the particular tensions observed . . . the suggestion of possible solutions and the
obtaining of formal State replies to these recommendations." 4 ' By putting the Commissioner's concerns into
writing and making the letters public, the correspondence
may also mobilize political pressure. 142
If the HCNM concludes, after investigation of a situation, that there exists a prima facie risk of potential conflict, then the Commissioner can issue an early
warning."i' This early warning automatically becomes an
agenda item for the next meeting of the Senior Council.
The document creating the post of High Commissioner

137. See Helsinki Summit, supra note 59, at 1397. The ability to travel is
subject to some procedural requirements, mainly involving consultation with the
participating state to which the High Commissioner intends to travel. See id. at
1398. But, the HCNM's ability to travel is not subject to the consent of the
state to which the Commissioner intends to travel. See id. Indeed, the receiving
state has a duty to assure the "free travel and communication of the High
Commissioner." See id.
138. See Helsinki Summit, supra note 59, at 1397.
139. See Estebanez, supra note 129, at 145. As a practical matter, the
HCNM usually engages in direct contact with state authorities at the national
and regional levels, non-governmental organizations (including bodies organized
by and for national minority groups), and individuals. See id.
140. Helsinki Summit, supra note 59, at 1398.
141. Estebanez, supra note 129, at 146; see also supra note 95 and accompanying text; see infra note 225 and accompanying text (describing some of
this correspondence in more detail).
142. See Wippman, supra note 87, at 616 (noting normative force of public
scrutiny).
143. See Helsinki Summit, supra note 59, at 1397.
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suggests that an early warning may constitute grounds for
the initiation of the Berlin Mechanism. 1" Even if no early warning is issued, the High Commissioner will provide
a report to the Chairman-in-Office, which will be forwarded to the Senior Council.' 45 Consensus Minus One could
then be used, in response to a report by the HCNM, to
condemn a state's violation of national minority rights over
that state's objection. The activities and practical impact of
the High Commissioner will be examined in Part V.
IV. THE LEGAL STATUS OF OSCE COMMITMENTS

A cursory reading of the text of the Helsinki Final Act
probably creates the impression that it constitutes a
treaty.'" There is good reason, however, to believe that
the signatory states of the Final Act, particularly the Western states, did not intend it to be legally binding.'47 As a
consequence of the apparent contradiction, international
lawyers have been pondering the legal status of OSCE
commitments since the ink dried on the Final Act.
The beginning of any inquiry into the legal status of
OSCE commitments requires a discussion of the sources of

144. See Helsinki Summit, supra note 59; see also supra notes 116-20 and
accompanying text (describing Berlin Mechanism).
145. See Helsinki Summit, supra note 59.
146. See van Dijk, supra note 4, at 106. This impression would be even
stronger after a reading of a concluding document from one of the more recent
consensus meetings. See id. While the Final Act contains both discretionary and
mandatory language, the language in more recent documents is mostly indicative of mandatory rights and duties. See id.
147. See, e.g., Michael Bothe, Legal and Non-Legal Norms - A Meaningful
Distinction in International Relations?, 11 NETH. Y.B. INT'L LAW 65, 65
(1980) ("In his final speech at the Helsinki Conference (CSCE) in 1975, Prime
Minister Wilson called the Final Act of the Conference a 'moral commitment,'
not an international treaty"); Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 375 (noting most
states at original Helsinki conference did not intend to conclude treaty); Marian
Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 515, 517 (1994) (indicating United States did not
consider Helsinki Final Act to be legally binding); Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L.
296, 296 (1977) (stating that "Statements by delegates during the Conference,
notably by the United States and other Western delegations, expressed their understanding that the Final Act did not involve a "legal" commitment and was
not intended to be binding upon the signatory Powers."); van Dijk, supra note
4, at 106 & n.48 (collecting citations to speeches indicating Final Act was not
intended to be legally binding).
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international law. The Statute of the International Court of
Justice sets out the sources of international law in Article
38:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are
submitted to it, shall apply: international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations; ....

The two principle sources of international law, "international conventions" (i.e., treaties) and "international custom,"
will be discussed below in Parts IV.A and IV.B.
A. Treaty Obligations
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states
that a treaty represents "an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by interna'
The essence of the Vienna Convention deftional law." 149
inition of treaties is that they be governed by international
law. 150 Whether an agreement is governed by international
law is a matter of the intent of the parties to the treaty. 1"' That intent can be deduced from the language and

148.

STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

art. 38, para. 1.

Article 38, para. 1 mentions three sources of international law but the third,
"general principles," is usually superseded by the first two. Id. "General principles" were probably included in the Statute as a source of international law
to prevent a non liquet in the absence of an apposite custom or treaty. See id.
See SHABTAi ROSENNE, THE
COURT, 1920-1996 § 111.376,

LAW

AND

PRACTICE

OF

THE

INTERNATIONAL

at 1601-02 (3d. ed. 1997). While the position of
"general principles" in Article 38 indicates that they are not formally inferior
to customs or treaties, when present, customs and treaties will usually prevail
over general principles because lex specialis derogat generali. See id. at 1605-

1606. Consequently, the category of "general principles" has little legal vitality
and will not be separately discussed. See id.
149. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(l)(a), 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 333 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
150. See id. at art. 3 (noting above requirements of Convention do not affect
legal validity of non-conforming agreements). The requirements that the agreement be between states and in written form are not essential parts of the definition of a treaty; see also Nash, supra note 147, at 515; van Dijk, supra note
4, at 107.
151. See Nash, supra note 147, at 515; Schachter, supra note 147, at 29697; van Dijk, supra note 4, at 107. See also Aegean Sea Continental Shelf
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context of the document, from the circumstances of its
conclusion, or from the explanations or statements made by
the signatories. 52 Unless essentially the same statement
was made by all the parties at signature, there may be
doubt that all the signatories possessed the identical intent. 153 Inferring intent from the language of the document remains preferable to inferring intent from the statements of some or even a majority of states at signing.
Plenty of evidence exists in the language of the Helsinki Final Act to infer that the document was not intended to be governed by international law. Three provisions
in particular are important. Immediately following the
Guiding Principles of the Final Act is the following statement:
The participating States, paying due regard to the
principles above and, in particular, to the first
sentence of the tenth principle, "Fulfillment in good
faith of obligations under international law," note
that the present Declaration does not affect their
rights and obligations, nor the corresponding treaties
and other agreements and arrangements.'

This statement claims that the Final
the participating states' obligations
law. 55 Since the Final Act contains
this would be true if the Act were
legally binding. 56
'

Act does not affect
under international
new commitments,
not intended to be

(Greece v. Turkey), 1978 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Dec. 19). Although the Court only refers to intent once, it is clear from the Court's inquiry, that it is evaluating
the intent of the parties. See id. at 44, para. 107.
152. See Nash, supra note 147, at 515; Schachter, supra note 147, at 297;
See also Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 151, at 43. The Court ad-

dresses the text of the alleged agreement only briefly, perhaps because the text
was quite ambiguous. See id. at 43 para. 105. The Court devotes considerable
space to a detailed evaluation of the context of the alleged agreement. See id.
at 41-43, paras. 100-04. Interestingly, the Court also touched briefly on the
subsequent practice of the parties as an indication of their respective intents.
See id. at 43-44, para. 106.

153. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. For instance, most of the
statements of intent cited in the OSCE literature come from Western states. See

id. Were one to rely solely on statements of intent, the position of the Eastern
European states might be unclear. See id.
154. Final Act, supra note 2, at 1296.
155. See Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 376.
156. See van Dijk, supra note 4, at 108.
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The second important provision relates to Article 102 of
the Charter of the United Nations. Article 102 of the
Charter places an affirmative obligation on all members of
the UN to register every treaty and international agreement
with the UN Secretariat as soon as it comes into force.'57
The Final Act requests that the government of Finland
transmit the text of the Act to the UN Secretariat for informational purposes but specifically states that the Act "is
not eligible for registration under Article 102 of the Charter." 5' Again, this implies that the Final Act was not intended to be a treaty or international agreement. 5 '
The final significant provision occurs at the end, where
it is stated that the participating states are "mindful of the
high political significance which they attach to the results
of the Conference."" In light of the other provisions of
the Final Act, the choice of the word "political" to qualify
the nature of the results of the Act cannot be dismissed as
irrelevant. It represents a deliberate choice designed to
draw a distinction between the political nature of the Act
and the legal nature of other international agreements.
The language of the Helsinki Final Act indicates that it
was not intended to be governed by international law.
Consequently, the Helsinki Final Act was not a treaty or
any other form of legally binding international agreement.' 6 ' Instead, it represents an example of a class of
non-binding agreements made between states and often
referred to as "gentleman's agreements."162
For many of the same reasons that suggest the Final Act
was not a treaty, close examination of subsequent OSCE
documents suggest that they were not intended to be gov157. U.N. CHARTER art. 102, para. 1.
158. Final Act, supra note 2, at 1325.
159. See Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 376; Schachter, supra note 147, at
298 (arguing that failure to register document under Article 102 is evidence
that document was not intended to be legally binding); van Dijk, supra note 4,
at 108 (concluding that failure to register document under Article 102, while
not decisive, is evidence of intent not to create legal obligations).
160. Final Act, supra note 52, at 1325 (emphasis added).
161. See van Dijk, supra note 4, at 109.
162. See Bothe, supra note 147, at 70-75 (providing brief history of nonlegal interstate agreements); Nash, supra note 147, at 515 (providing brief
history of gentlemen's agreements); Schachter, supra note 147, at 299 (describing "gentlemen's agreements" as precise and definite agreements which are not
legally binding but which nevertheless presume compliance).
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erned by international law either. Most of these documents
contain language with respect to Article 102 of the United
Nations Charter that is very similar to the language in the
Final Act."6 Several of them also seem to embrace the
political/legal distinction by stressing the political significance of the commitments. 1" This has led to the conclusion that OSCE documents are not treaties governed by
international law. 165
B. Customary International Law
OSCE commitments, however, may have become international law, even though the documents which express them
were not intended at their time of signature to be legally
binding, because there exists a second method by which
legally binding international norms can be formed. The
commitments in OSCE documents could have become
customary international law. t" Custom is usually thought
of as universal (i.e., binding on every state). Regional or
even local customs, however, are possible. 167 If there is a
customary international law generated by OSCE documents,
it applies only to the OSCE states.
The requirements of custom stem from Article 38(1) of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, t " which

163. See, e.g., Budapest Summit Declaration, supra note 1, at 770; Helsinki
Summit, supra note 59, at 1393; Charter of Paris, supra note 25, at 208.
164. See, e.g., Guidelines on an OSCE Document-Charter on European Security, 37 I.L.M. 693, 695 (1998) (stressing that any comprehensive OSCE document on European security should be "politically binding"); Charter of Paris,
supra note 25, at 208 (stressing the "high political significance" of the Charter
of Paris); Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting 1986, 28 I.L.M. 527,
532 (1989) (noting that "respect for and full application of these principles as
well as strict compliance with all CSCE commitments deriving from them, are
of great political importance") (emphasis added).
165. See Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 375-78; Duncan B. Hollis, Note, Accountability in Chechnya - Addressing Internal Matters with Legal and Political
Norms, 36 B.C. L. REV. 793, 836-37 (1995); Miriam Shapiro, Changing the
CSCE into the OSCE: Legal Aspects of a Political Transformation, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 631, 633-34 (1995); Wippman, supra note 87, at 615.
166. See Bothe, supra note 147, at 87 (suggesting that non-legal documents
can form basis for customary international law).
167. See Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276-77 (Nov. 20) (recognizing possibility of, but ultimately rejecting, existence of regional LatinAmerican custom).
168. See id. at 266, 276-77 (Nov. 20) (noting that elements of custom follow
from language of Article 38).
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describes custom as a "general practice accepted as
law." 169 Custom, consequently, consists of a general state
practice, plus a belief that the practice is a legal right or
is compelled by law (often referred to as opinio juris).7 °
Different ICJ cases have formulated the tests for the two
elements in different language. Compare, for example, the
idea of "constant and uniform" practice required by the
ICJ in 1950171 to the idea of instant custom suggested in
1969172 or the loose approach the ICJ took to contradictory practice in 1986.173 There is broad agreement, however, that custom formation requires two things:
1. A general practice among states, plus
2. A belief that the practice constitutes law (opinio juris). 174
Thus, the possibility arises that OSCE commitments have
become customary international law, even though they were
not intended to be legally binding at the time OSCE documents promulgated them. Evidence for this proposition may
be found in OSCE documents.
1. A General Practice Amongst OSCE States
Numerous statements in OSCE documents are written in
terms indicative of a general practice among OSCE states.
OSCE documents often include a statement that OSCE
states intend to fully implement all OSCE commitments.

169. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38, para. 1.
170. See Asylum, supra note 167, at 276; North Sea Continental Shelf
(F.R.G. v. Den. and F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb. 20) (holding
that "[n]ot only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they
must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a
belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it"); Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 97-98 (June 27) [hereinafter
Nicaraguan Case].
171. Asylum, supra note 167, at 276.
172. See North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 151, at 42.
173. See Nicaraguan Case, supra note 170, at 98 (stating that "[tihe Court
does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the
corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the
rule").
174. See generally MARK VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
TREATIES: A MANUAL ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERRELATION
OF SOURCES 29-55, paras. 34-78 (2d ed. 1997) (giving overview of modern
custom formation).
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The language of the concluding document of the Vienna
Meeting is typical of such statements: "Accordingly, [the
participating states] reaffirmed their resolve to implement
fully, unilaterally, bilaterally, and multilaterally, all the
CSCE
other
and
Act
of the Final
provisions
documents."' 75 Stretching as they do over a period of
nearly ten years,' 76 these declarations are evidence of a
general state practice consistent with OSCE principles. The
most likely critique of this conclusion is that the practice
has not been sufficiently uniform or of sufficient duration
to constitute a general practice.
Admittedly, the implementation of OSCE human rights
commitments has not been perfect or uniform. Disagreement on the implementation of human rights was a hallmark of the Cold War follow-up meetings," and the
OSCE has acknowledged that while implementation has
greatly improved in recent years, there is room for further
improvement.' 78 Neither perfection nor uniformity, however, is required. The declarations are sufficient evidence of
a general practice to meet the standard set out by the
International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua Case.'79 In

175. See Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting 1986, Nov. 4, 1986Jan. 17, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 527, 531 [hereinafter Vienna Meeting]. See also
Budapest Summit Declaration, supra note 1, at 769 (1995) (noting that "[w]e
confirm the significance of the Human Dimension in all activities of the CSCE.
Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of
law is an essential component of security and co-operation in the CSCE region"); Helsinki Summit, supra note 59, at 1390 ("[w]e reaffirm the validity of
the guiding principles and common values of the Helsinki Final Act and the
Charter of Paris"); Document of Moscow Meeting, supra note 92, at 1672
("The participating States renew their commitment to implement fully all the
principles and provisions of the Final Act . . . and of other CSCE
documents"); Charter of Paris, supra note 25, at 193 ("Full implementation of
all CSCE commitments must form the basis for the initiatives we are now
taking to enable our nations to live in accordance with their aspirations.").
176. Some rights may have been generally practiced for nearly twenty-five
years. For instance, the right of access to information originated in the Final
Act. But the rights most important to this paper only came into being beginning in and after 1989. Consequently, the lower figure seemed the most appropriate.
177. See supra notes 18, 45 and accompanying text.
178. See generally Document of Moscow Meeting, supra note 92, at 1672
(noting that. while "the degree of compliance with the commitments contained
in the relevant provisions of the CSCE documents had shown substantial improvement since the Copenhagen Meeting . . . serious threats to and violations
of CSCE principles and provisions continue to exist").
179. See Nicaraguan Case, supra note 170, at 173 and accompanying text.
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that case, the ICJ found a customary norm prohibiting the
use of force in international relations," despite a history
of recurrent violations of that norm."' If the Nicaragua
Case is the standard by which state practice is judged,
then there is almost certainly a general practice consistent
with OSCE commitments.
It might be contended that the North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases82 are a better paradigm for analyzing practice in conformity with OSCE commitments. OSCE documents represent non-legal agreements that place on paper
brand new commitments between the participating states.
As such, they are analogous to the equidistance principle at
issue in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, which was
not a direct treaty obligation of the Federal Republic of
Germany and did not state a pre-existing practice on the
delimitation of continental shelf boundaries. The ICJ accepted that written documents, even if they did not instantly "crystallize" a new customary norm,'83 could function
as "norm-creating" provisions around which a customary
rule in accordance with the document would coalesce.,
This is exactly the role that OSCE documents would perform in the creation of a customary rule in accordance
with OSCE human rights commitments. The ICJ went on
to conclude that while a written document could accelerate
the formation of a customary rule, customs formed in such
an accelerated fashion would be subject to a higher standard of state practice: the "extensive and virtually
uniform" standard."' 5 It makes sense to require a higher
standard of uniformity when the length of the practice is
shortened because of a claim that the process of custom
180. See Nicaraguan Case, supra note 170, at 99.-100 para. 188 (deducing
customary norm prohibiting use of force in international relations).
181. See, e.g., Anthony Clark Arend, InternationalLaw and the Recourse to
Force: A Shift in Paradigms, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 6-28 (1990) (chronicling
massive and recurrent violations of prohibition on use of force); Thomas M.
Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809, 810-11 (1970)
(noting that by 1970 there had already been more than one hundred violations
of prohibition on use of force).
182. See North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 151, at 3.
183. See North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 151, at 41-42 (recognizing
that treaty could crystallize norm of customary international law almost instantly).
184. See North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 151, at 41.
185. See North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 151, at 43.
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formation has been accelerated by a written formulation of
the rule. The reduction in the evidentiary value of a general practice because of the limited length of that practice is
offset by a more stringent requirement of uniformity.
It is here that the analogy to OSCE documents breaks
down. The provision at issue in the North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases had been around for less than one year at the
time that the dispute arose between the litigants.86
OSCE commitments, however, have been the subject of a
general practice since at least the end of the Cold War, a
period of nearly ten years. In light of the much greater
length of the practice in the OSCE, it does not make
sense to require the "extensive and virtually uniform"
standard of the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. Instead,
the standard of the Nicaragua Case is the appropriate
standard by which to evaluate OSCE practice. Under that
standard, OSCE commitments constitute a general practice
among OSCE states (the first element of the formation of
a custom).
2. Opinio Juris
Opinio juris is generally defined as a state's belief that
the action it is engaging in is either a legal right or required by international law. 87 For the OSCE, the important question is whether there is a distinction between
"required" and "required by law." OSCE states accept that
OSCE human rights commitments are required by participation in the organization. 88 OSCE states have acknowledged that human rights commitments "are matters of
direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and
do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the
State concerned."189 In addition, most OSCE human rights
186. See North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 151, at 43.
187. See VILLGER, supra note 174, at 47-48, pars. 65-66.
188. See Bothe, supra note 147, at 65 (noting that language and context of
Final Act indicate that states have obligation to base their conduct on provisions of Act); van Dijk, supra note 4, at 110, 118-19 (indicating that many
heads of state at signing of Final Act felt Act created binding, if non-legal,
commitments).
189. Helsinki Summit, supra note 59, at 1390; See also Report of National
Minorities, supra note 92, at 1695-96 ("Issues concerning national minorities . . . are matters of legitimate concern and consequently do not constitute
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commitments are phrased as mandatory as opposed to
aspirational or discretionary rights.19° This conclusion is
strengthened by the institutionalization of the OSCE since
the end of the Cold War 91 and the growth of human
rights implementation mechanisms,"
which both imply
the mandatory nature of OSCE commitments.
It is also instructive to see what commitments new
OSCE states have undertaken since the end of the Cold
War. At the 1992 Prague Meeting of the Council, ten
former Soviet states joined the OSCE.9 All ten states
submitted identical acceptances of the OSCE commitments.
Their letters of accession began:
The Government of [name of the State] hereby
adopts the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris
for a New Europe, and all other documents of the
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.
The Government of [name of the State] accepts in
their entirety all commitments and responsibilities
contained in those documents, and declares its
determination to act in accordance with their provisions. "

This language makes it clear that compliance with OSCE
commitments is not optional but required by participation
in the organization.
At the same time, the OSCE has maintained a distinction between legal and political commitments. As recently
as December of 1997, the Ministerial Council made reference to the "politically binding" nature of OSCE commitexclusively an internal affair of the respective State"); see Document of Moscow Meeting, supra note 92, at 1672 (announcing that "the participating states
categorically and irrevocably declare that the commitments undertaken in the
field of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate
concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal
affairs of the State concerned").
190. See supra Part HI. C. All but one of the national minority rights discussed in Part Ill. C is phrased as a mandatory right. See id. The one provision that is discretionary, the creation of autonomous national minority regions,
is conspicuous for its difference. See id.
191. See supra Part II. C.
192. See supra Part III. D.
193. See Prague Meeting, supra note 76, at 978. The states present included
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgistan, Moldova, Tajikstan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. See id.

194. See Prague Meeting, supra note 76, at 985-86.
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Previous OSCE documents have repeatedly
ments. '
stressed the political/legal distinction." The result is that
OSCE documents clearly convey a belief that OSCE commitments are "politically required by participation." If
opinio juris is satisfied by the mandatory nature of the
commitments, then OSCE commitments are customary international law. On the other hand, if a belief in the legal
nature of the requirement is critical to opinio juris, then
OSCE commitments are not customary international law.
The elements of custom formation stem from Article 38
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The
language of Article 38, "a general practice accepted as
law," suggests that the legal nature of the requirement
comprises a critical component of opinio juris. Furthermore, language following Article 38 can be found in ICJ
cases. 97 The treatment of the issue in ICJ caselaw, however, warrants discussion. In the Asylum Case, the ICJ rejected evidence of a practice amongst Latin American
states because Colombia could not show that the practice
resulted from a "duty incumbent on [the states] and not
merely for reasons of political expediency." 98 In the
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the ICJ, commenting
on opinio juris, stated that: "There are many international
acts, e.g., in the field of ceremonial and protocol, which
are performed almost invariably, but which are motivated
only by considerations of courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not by any sense of legal duty."'"
Both of these explanations of opinio juris set up a dichotomy between actions performed out of a sense of legal
duty, on the one hand, and actions which are performed
because of political expediency, courtesy, convenience, or
tradition on the other. OSCE commitments do not fit
cleanly into either category. While OSCE states have referred to them as political commitments, it is clear that the

195. See Guidelines on an OSCE Document-Charter on European Security,
Dec. 19, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 693, 695 (1998).
196. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
197. See North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 151, at 44 (stating that
opinio juris is "a belief that [the practice at issue] is rendered obligatory by
the existence of a rule of law requiring it") (emphasis added).
198. Asylum, supra note 167, at 277.
199. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 151, at 44.
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commitments are understood as mandatory. They are not
done because of expediency, courtesy, convenience, or
tradition. If OSCE commitments must be shoehorned into
one category or the other, then they look more like the
commitments that are performed out of a sense of legal
duty.
As if to further confuse the issue, the ICJ's decision in
the Nicaragua Case relies on Principle II of the Helsinki
Final Act as evidence of opinio juris for a customary
prohibition on the use of force in international relations." No mention at all -is made of the political/legal
distinction in the Final Act. There is no doubt that some
of the commitments undertaken by OSCE states are legally
binding on those states for reasons unrelated to the OSCE.
The language the ICJ relied on in Nicaragua merely restated the commitments that all the participating states were
subject to as members of the United Nations.2"° Yet the
ICJ was not relying on the language as a restatement of
the United States' treaty commitments because the ICJ did
not have jurisdiction to address the treaty obligation. The
Court relied on the language as an independent embodiment
of opinio juris. Some statements in OSCE documents have
opinio juris, but it is unclear whether only those statements
that reprise existing legal commitments have opinio juris.
The result is very unsatisfactory. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice indicates that a
legal duty represents a critical component of custom, as
does the boilerplate language of ICJ decisions. The explanation of opinio juris in ICJ cases, however, focuses on a
legality/expediency dichotomy. OSCE commitments do not
fit comfortably into either category but are closer to the
legal category. The ICJ's reliance on the Helsinki Final
Act, as evidence of opinio juris in a customary prohibition
on the use of force, further confuses matters.
It may be that if the participating states continue to
maintain the artificial distinction between "politically bind-

200. See Nicaraguan Case, supra note 170, at 100, para. 189 (stating that
"[a]cceptance of a text in these terms confirms the existence of an opinio
juris.").
201. See Nicaraguan Case, supra note 170, at 100 para. 189; U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
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ing" and "legally binding" undertakings, then OSCE commitments will not become customary international law.
After all, custom is the positive creation of states, and
states presumably have considerable freedom to craft custom in ways that meet their needs. If OSCE states conclude that the strength and flexibility of OSCE commitments will be furthered by a distinction between political
commitments and legal commitments, 2 then that distinction will probably be perpetuated. 3
V.

POLITICALLY BINDING COMMITMENTS

If OSCE commitments are not legally binding, then what
are the consequences of "politically binding" commitments?
To what extent is a politically binding commitment different from a legal obligation? Oscar Schachter has suggested
that the primary difference is that the violation of politically binding commitments does not give rise to a claim for
reparations or judicial remedies." Nevertheless, Schachter
argued that politically binding commitments may still exert
influence over the actions of states, both by causing specific acts by officials of a bound state to conform with such
commitments and by opening covered matters to international scrutiny.' Of these two effects, the latter has certainly occurred in the OSCE.2° The question remains
202. See BASIC DOCUMENTS 1993-1995, supra note 69, at xix; Shapiro,
supra note 165, at 634-37 (arguing that some OSCE states, particularly the
United States, have opposed attempted creation of legal commitments because
of concerns that such attempt would damage OSCE's "political flexibility or
inclusive nature").
203. See Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 377-78, 378 (suggesting that recent
OSCE documents have sought to prevent passage of OSCE commitments into
customary international law by "reinforcing the political character of CSCE
provisions"). But see Ernest S. Easterly IlI, The Rule of Law and New World
Order, 22 S.U. L. REV. 161, 176-77 (1995) (arguing that "the nature of the
practice evidenced by the several documents of the CSCE process, . . . and
repeated affirmations of legal obligation (even when disguised as 'political
commitments'), suggest emerging norms of customary international law"). See
also supra note 56 (suggesting that there may be tension within OSCE about
legal status of OSCE commitments).
204. See Schachter, supra note 147, at 300. See also Bothe, supra note 147,
at 87-88 (arguing that non-legal commitments do not give rise to judicial relief,
and suggesting, in addition, that violation of non-legal commitments would not
give rise to a right of reprisal).
205. See Schachter, supra note 147, at 303-04.
206. See Helsinki Summit, supra note 59, at 1390; Report of National Mi-
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whether OSCE commitments have resulted in specific acts
in conformity with those commitments. The evidence suggests that OSCE commitments have resulted in conforming
acts.
Schachter's article appeared in 1977, before the OSCE
had been around long enough for anyone to know whether
its "political commitments" would influence the actions of
states. Yet, the conclusion of more recent commentators is
that whether one considers OSCE commitments to be legal
or political, they have had a real influence on the actions
of participating states.2 7 Thomas Buergenthal has described OSCE commitments as "the source of an
overarching European constitutional order that sets the standard to which all national legal and political institutions in
Europe must conform."2 8 While this claim is inherently
difficult to substantiate, other writers have noted more concrete achievements of the OSCE.
A study of the conflict in Chechnya has suggested that
the OSCE's role in the Chechen conflict "demonstrates
both the normative force of its agreements as well as the
utility in internal armed conflicts of its implementation
mechanisms."2°9

Political

pressure

from

OSCE

states

forced Russia to concede the applicability of OSCE principles to the Chechen conflict,21° a conflict that most states
recognized as an "internal" Russian matter.211 The Russian government eventually agreed to allow an OSCE mission to travel to Chechnya to observe the conflict. The
mission's conclusions forced the Russian government to
admit that its forces had committed grave human rights
violations in Chechnya.212 Eventually, OSCE participation
led to a permanent OSCE presence in Chechnya to monitor
human rights and keep the peace.2"3 Chechnya represents

norities, supra note 92, at 1695-96; Document of Moscow Meeting, supra note
92, at 1672.
207. See Schlager, supra note 24 (concluding that OSCE contributed significantly to fall of communism in Europe).
208. See Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 380-81.
209. See Hollis, supra note 165, at 842.
210. See Hollis, supra note 165, at 807-08.
211. See Hollis, supra note 165, at 805-07.
212. See Hollis, supra note 165, at 809-10.
213. See Hollis, supra note 165, at 810.
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an example of a situation where the mobilization of international scrutiny affected the actions of a state.214
While the general implementation mechanisms have
achieved moderate success, some commentators have suggested that the post of High Commissioner on National
Minorities constitutes the "most promising" OSCE implementation mechanism. 215 The Commissioner has garnered
considerable success in directing the course of national minority policy in those OSCE states where the Commissioner has become involved. 216 Experts hope that an examination of activities of the High Commissioner,1 7 in
his first year of operation (1993),18 will demonstrate the
effectiveness of the position. In 1993, the High Commissioner visited Slovakia to study the situation of the Hungarian minority and Hungary to study the situation of the
Slovakian minority. At his request, Hungary and Slovakia
each consented to accept four visits by a team of minority
rights experts over a period of two years. The team sub-

214. See Wippman, supra note 87, at 616 (pointing out normative power of
public scrutiny).
215. See Wippman, supra note 87, at 617.
216. See BASIC DOCUMENTS 1993-1995, supra note 69, at xx-xxi. "Although
the activities of the High Commissioner belong [to] the realm of silent diplomacy in most instances ... , he has acquired a high reputation as an international institution which may be quite instrumental in defusing tensions around
minority issues." Id. Martin Alexanderson, The Need for a Generalised Application of the Minorities Regime in Europe, 8 HELSINKI MONITOR, Issue 4,
1997 at 47, 52 (concluding that recommendations of HCNM have "often contributed to necessary revisions of national legislation and to establishing consultations mechanisms between minorities and the government"); Estebanez, supra
note 129, at 158 (concluding that OSCE states have often welcomed participation of HCNM, and have been willing to accept Commissioner's recommendations); Pejic, supra note 91, at 683 (stating that "[Tihe manner in which the
office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities functions has been
widely acclaimed as being on target."); Shapiro, supra note 165, at 633 (noting
effectiveness of High Commissioner in defusing minority tensions in Baltics and
Central Europe). But see Estebanez, supra note 129, at 158 (noting that some
states have directly questioned role of HCNM, claiming both that Commissioner
is not impartial, and that Commissioner has failed to properly appreciate states'
domestic legislation).
217. See Estebanez, supra note 129, at 145-56 (providing general analysis of
operation of post of High Commissioner).
218. See Factsheet of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, (last
visited Nov. 27, 1998) <http:www.osce.org/inst/hcnm/hcnm#.htm>. The High
Commissioner on National Minorities in 1993 was Mr. Max Van der Stoel of
the Netherlands. See id. He was appointed in December of 1992 after the creation of the post, and his second and last term as High Commissioner will expired at the end of 1998. See id.
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mitted its report, identifying the concerns of the respective
national minority groups, to the High Commissioner in
September of 1993.219
The High Commissioner also visited Romania and submitted a number of recommendations to the Romanian
government with respect to the Hungarian and Roma minorities." ° He visited the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia to start a dialogue with the Yugoslav Macedonian government on the situation of the ethnic Albanian
population.22 He then traveled to Albania to hear the
views of the Albanian government on the situation of
ethnic Albanians in Macedonia and to address allegations
of systematic discrimination and violence against ethnic
Greeks in Albania. He subsequently visited Greece to
discuss the situation of ethnic Greeks in Albania with the
Greek government.' 2
Throughout the year, the High Commissioner made
several visits to the Baltic states in response to allegations
of discrimination against the sizeable Russian minorities in
those countries. The High Commissioner's visits yielded no
evidence of persecution, but the Commissioner submitted
recommendations to the governments of Estonia and Latvia
on the opening of a dialogue with national minority
groups. The High Commissioner was forced to return to
Estonia later in the year because of the adoption of a
controversial law on the status of aliens, which would have
affected much of the Russian minority. The Commissioner
prepared an expert opinion for the President of Estonia on
the law on the status of aliens. As a result of the advice,
the Estonian Parliament amended the law.'
During the first year of the office's operation, the High
Commissioner made extensive use of his travel and investigative powers to bring the situation of national minorities
to the attention of OSCE states., The HCNM obtained the
commitment of Hungary and Slovakia to a multi-year study

219.
annual
220.
221.
222.
223.

See BASIC DOCUMENTS 1993-1995,
report of secretary general).
See BASIC DOCUMENTS 1993-1995,
See BASiC DOCUMENTS 1993-1995,
See BASIC DOCUMENTS 1993-1995,
See BASIC DOCUMENTS 1993-1995,

supra note 69, at 10-12 (reproducing
supra
supra
supra
supra

note
note
note
note

69,
69,
69,
69,

at
at
at
at
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of their national minority groups. The High Commissioner
also successfully modified the national minority policy in
Estonia.
Turning to the present, the High Commissioner is currently involved in situations in Albania, Croatia, Estonia,
Hungary, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine.24 The Commissioner's involvement with Kyrgyzstan warrants closer scrutiny.'
Following a visit to Kyrgyzstan, the High Commissioner
formulated a series of concrete proposals designed to bring
Kyrgyzstan into compliance with its OSCE commitments. 2 6 Most importantly, the Commissioner proposed
the creation of an Executive Council within the national
Assembly that would coordinate government policy aimed
at compliance With OSCE commitments. Following that
recommendation, the government of Kyrgyzstan agreed to
the creation of such an Executive Council. 7
The High Commissioner has obtained success shaping the
national minority policy of OSCE states. For a number of
reasons, however, the High Commissioner seems much
more likely to successfully shape the direction of national
minority policy in the states of Eastern Europe. First of
all, the Eastern European states are more willing to embrace change on minority issues, particularly because of a
desire to become members of Western European organizations like the European Union and the Council of Europe." Secondly, as an "instrument of conflict prevention," the Commissioner has been focused exclusively on
the conflicts of Eastern Europe. 9 Finally, the Western
224. See Factsheet of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, supra
note 218.
225. See BASIC DOCUMENTS 1993-1995, supra note 69, at pages 707-15 (reproducing correspondence between High Commissioner and government of
Kyrgyzstan, among others).
226. See BASIC DOCUMENTS 1993-1995, supra note 69, at 711-12.
227. See BASIC DOCUMENTS 1993-1995, supra note 69, at 715.
228. See Estebanez, supra note 129, at 140 (arguing that many Central and
Eastern European countries are more willing to address minority issues because
of their concern for international legitimacy). Estebanez notes that Eastern European states are also more likely to enact international human rights standards
directly into their domestic laws and constitutions, out of a desire to achieve
membership in 'Western' organizations. See id. at 145. See also Alexanderson,
supra note 216, at 50-51.
229. See Alexanderson, supra note 216, at 52 (statute that "[U]ntil now, all
of the recommendations issued by the High Commissioner have focused exclu-
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democracies have been less willing than Eastern European
As a result, the HCNM is
states to accept interference.'
unlikely to become involved in the Western democracies."
PART

VI. NATIONAL MINORITY RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES

A. The Diversity of Native American Culture
While it would be possible to simply begin discussing
the application of OSCE national minority rights in the
United States, it will be much more engaging to place that
discussion in a specific context. Consequently, what follows
is a discussion of the application of OSCE national minority rights to Native American tribes in the United States.
It is best to begin with some information about Native
Americans. Today, there are more than five hundred federally recognized tribes in the United States, though slightly
more than two hundred of those live in Alaska. 32 In addition, there are more than one hundred tribes which are
no longer federally recognized. 33 Nearly half of all Native Americans live on more than three hundred reservations, with the largest land holdings in the Southwestern
The 1990 census indicated that almost
United States.'
two million people in the United States consider themselves
to be Native American.235 The largest tribes, like the
Cherokee and Navajo, have populations in excess of one
hundred thousand, while more than one hundred tribes
have populations under one thousand.2 36 With more than
sively on problems concerning national minorities in Central and Eastern
Europe").
230. See Estebanez, supra note 129, at 140 (suggesting that 'Western
democracies' use their leading position in OSCE to avoid addressing national
minority issues). See also Alexanderson, supra note 216, at 51 (noting that

"few of the Western states have taken significant recent measures to protect
and promote the interests of minorities").
231. See Alexanderson, supra note 216, at 52.
232. See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 8 (3d ed. 1993).
233.

See id. at 12.

234. See id. at 9, 15 (summarizing Table of Indian Land Holdings).
235. See id. at 13.
236. See id. at 12-13 (referring to Table).
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five hundred tribes living all across the country in groups
as small as a few hundred members to as large as one
hundred thousand, one can begin to understand the diversity of Native Americans. Tribes live in the deserts of the
Southwest, the plains of the Midwest, the forests of the
Northwest, and the northern reaches of Alaska. Furthermore, they have adapted their cultures to their environments.
Native American tribes do not represent parts of a
monolithic whole. While tribes may share characteristics, in
the aggregate, Native American tribes show great diversity
in culture, religion, and language. Entire sections of modern libraries are filled with books describing and comparing the cultures of Native Americans. 37 There even exists
an academic journal, the American Indian Culture and Research Journal, devoted to the study of Native American
cultures.38 In addition to diverse cultures, 9 Native
Americans speak more than one hundred separate languages 240 and possess varied religious beliefs. 24 There is
simply not enough space here to describe the variety of
Native American culture, language, or religion. It must be
enough to simply note that such variety exists and that it
sets Native Americans apart from the dominant cultural
influences in the United States.
B. Establishing A Violation
Many difficulties for Native Americans stem from the
US-Mexican and US-Canadian borders. Both borders are
political creations that do not correspond to the historical
boundaries of native territories. As a result, many tribes

237. See generally DUANE CHAMPAGNE, NATIVE AMERICANS: PORTRAIT OF
PEOPLES (1994) (presenting comparative survey of Native American
history, culture, language, and religion).
238. See id. at 748-50 (listing academic journals devoted to Native American
issues).
239. See id. at 55-396 (comparing Native American cultures by geographic
region).
240. See id. at 397. Originally there may have been more than three hundred
native languages, but centuries of contact with European and American societies
have resulted in the loss of many. See id. at 397.
241. See id. at 441-523 (giving overview of some of basic similarities and
differences amongst Native American religions).
THE

HeinOnline -- 23 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 44 1999-2000

1999]

OSCE NATIONAL MINORITY RIGHTS

were divided242 and are forced to deal with the border as
part of their daily lives. Unfortunately, the modern border
regimes place numerous restrictions on border tribes and
threaten their cultural survival.243
For instance, the Tohono O'odham have lands in both
the United States and Mexico separated only by the border. 2" As part of their religion, economy and culture,
the Tohono O'Odham practice a migratory lifestyle. But
many Tohono O'odham have difficulty crossing the border
because they do not possess the documentation required by
US border officials.245 The Tohono O'odham believe that
US immigration laws restrict their ability to travel to
sacred sites, teach their children nomadic ways, and mainIn addition, U.S. customs officials
tain their language.'
often confiscate articles such as feathers, pine leaves, and
sweet grass at the border, which are essential to the religion and culture of the Tohono O'odham.247 These border-related restrictions inhibit the preservation of the
Tohono O'odham's traditional religion and culture.
Nor are the Tohono O'odham alone in their plight.
Native Americans on the U.S.-Canadian border face similar
difficulties. The American Blackfeet and the Canadian
Bloods are related tribes separated by the border'48 Trib-

al gatherings between the two groups form the center of
tribal cultural and religious life as well as provide forums
to trade raw materials, traditional handmade goods, and
medicine bundles.249 Customs laws, however, forbid the

242. See Sharon O'Brien, The Medicine Line: A Border Dividing Tribal Sovereignty, Economies and Families, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 315 (1984).
243. See Megan S. Austin, Note, A Culture Divided by the United StatesMexico Border: The Tohono O'Odham Claim for Border Crossing Rights, 8
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 97 (1991) (suggesting that "[clurrent restrictions
on [border crossing] deny the Tohono O'Odham fundamental human rights and
threaten the continued existence of their culture."); O'Brien, supra note 242, at
315. Stating that "[tihis border is an arbitrary barrier to their sovereignty and
a sunderer of their political institutions, tribal membership and even family
cohesion. It thus seriously impedes tribal political, economic, and social
development." Id.
244. See Austin, supra note 243, at 101.
245. See Austin, supra note 242, at 101.
246. See Austin, supra note 243, at 101, n.19.
247. See Austin, supra note 243, at 102.
248. See O'Brien, supra note 242, at 322.
249. See O'Brien, supra note 242, at 322.
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import or export of certain traditional plants and animals.
In addition, the searching of some religious objects (like
medicine bundles) destroys their religious significance."
Finally, customs duties impair the practice of traditional
skills such as the production of craft items. As the items
themselves are often made and sold across the border, two
sets of customs duties may be due, one on the importation
of raw materials and another if the finished product is sold
across the border."5 As a result, the Blackfeet and
Bloods have difficulty maintaining their traditional cultures.
And it is not just border tribes which are experiencing
difficulty maintaining their religion and culture. In Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 2 the
Supreme Court reversed a lower court's injunction against
the building of a logging road through an area sacred to
local tribes, 3 despite conceding that the road could destroy the tribes' ability to practice their religion."54 The
Court concluded that the Free Exercise clause of the First
Amendment did not provide a remedy for the harm. 5
Yet, the identity of the Yurok, Karok and Tolowa remains
inextricably bound up in their religion and its connection
to the land. 6 The building of the logging road might
well lead to the elimination of the tribes' cultures.5 7
As one commentator has noted, although the U.S. Constitution and international documents protect the basic human rights of Native Americans," "the sources of protection tend to focus on individual rights, thereby impairing

250. See O'Brien, supra note 242, at 322.
251. See O'Brien, supra note 242, at 331.
252. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
253. See id. at 458.
254. See id. at 451 ("The Government does not dispute, and we have no
reason to doubt that the logging and road-building projects . . . could have
devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices"). See also Christopher P. Cline, Note, Pursuing Native American Rights in International Law
Venues: A Jus Cogens Strategy After Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 591, 600-03 (1991) (describing close
connection between tribes' religion and proposed location of logging road).
255. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450-53 (drawing distinction between governmental
coercion of religious belief, which is prohibited, and "incidental effects" of
governmental action which are not prohibited).
256. See Cline, supra note 254, at 601.
257. See Cline, supra note 254, at 602-03.
258. See Austin, supra note 243, at 110-11.
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the recognition of group rights." 9 The rights most important to Native American tribes are collective rights that
would protect their cultures. 2" It is in the realm of collective rights that the application of OSCE national minority rights looks particularly appealing. While the individual
rights of the Blackfeet, Bloods, Tohono O'odham, Yurok,
Karok, and Tolowa tribes to practice their religion (including a right of access to religious objects)261 and maintain
contacts with members of their minorities in other states
have arguably been infringed,262 the most significant infringement is the United States' failure to adequately protect and promote Native American culture, language, and
religion.263 If U.S. governmental action makes it impossible for Native American groups to preserve their minority
identity, then the United States is under a duty to modify
its laws and actions to preserve Native American culture.
At the very least, the United States would be under a duty
to balance the benefit of the governmental action against
the harm to minority identity. A balancing of harm and
benefit was absent from the court's decision in Lyng but
would have resulted in an opposite outcome because the
benefit of the logging road was negligible while the harm
2 4
to the tribes was extreme. "
It is clear that OSCE documents contain collective rights
that would benefit Native American groups in the United
States. Furthermore, the United States has committed itself
to implementing OSCE rights. This, however, does not
mean that Native American groups can actually obtain the
benefit of those rights. The rest of this section will focus
on whether Native Americans are likely to secure any real
benefit from OSCE national minority rights.

259. Austin, supra note 243, at 110-11.
260. See Austin, supra note 243; See also Cline, supra note 254, at 618-19.
261. See Copenhagen Meeting, supra note 86.
262. See Copenhagen Meeting, supra note 86, at para. 32.4.
263. See Copenhagen Meeting, supra note 86 and accompanying text (indicating most important duty of OSCE states will be to protect ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity of national minorities on their territory and to
promote that identity).
264. See Cline, supra note 254, at 607.
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C. Legal Enforceability
The first question is whether Native American groups
fall within the OSCE definition of national minority
groups. Since the OSCE definition revolves around the
existence of a distinct ethnic, religious, linguistic, or cultural identity, it is clear that Native American tribes are
national minority groups.2 In fact, given the diversity
between Native American tribes, there may well be hundreds of individual national minority groups in the United
States. Since Native American tribes are national minority
groups, they are entitled to the rights in OSCE documents.
This leads to the legal enforceability of OSCE rights. As
discussed in Part IV, OSCE documents do not represent
treaties. If OSCE rights are legally enforceable, it is because they have become customary international law. It is
doubtful, however, whether this has happened. The outcome turns on the definition of opinio juris, and the analysis of ICJ jurisprudence on the issue provides no simple
answers. OSCE rights do not easily fit into the legality/expediency dichotomy that has characterized ICJ caselaw.
While OSCE rights are required, the OSCE has perpetuated the distinction between legal and political commitments.
A court might conclude that the mandatory nature of
OSCE commitments is sufficient to demonstrate opinio
juris, but it would be foolish to bank on it.
In addition, the United States would probably raise the
265. See Donald L. Fixico, The Persistence of Identity in Indian Communities
of the Western Great Lakes, in AMERICAN INDIANS: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY 109 (Donald E. Green & Thomas V. Tonnesen eds., 1991) (arguing that Native Americans have retained distinct identity despite centuries of
contact with Anglo-Americans and numerous attempts at forced assimilation);
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 232, at 26-30 (noting that Native Americans have
consistently strived to maintain a separate cultural identity despite attempts at
assimilation). See also supra notes 232-41 and accompanying text.
Native Americans were chosen as the subject of this section partly because they are clearly national minority groups under the OSCE definition. It is
harder to fit other groups (e.g., African-Americans) which are traditionally
thought of as minorities in the U.S. into the OSCE definition of a national
minority. National minority status revolves around ethnic, linguistic, religious
and cultural identity. While African-Americans arguably have an ethnic and
cultural identity, they share religions and language with Anglo-Americans. In
light of the cautionary language of the 1991 Geneva Meeting of Experts on
National Minorities, supra note 92, it is not clear that African-Americans are
national minority groups.
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"persistent objector" defense if the issue were before an
international court.2" The concept of the persistent objector finds expression in dicta from the Asylum267 and Fisheries"6 cases. In both cases, the ICJ had already. concluded that no customary rule existed but nonetheless suggested that the respondent's persistent objections would
have exempted it from such a rule. A well-known formulation of the doctrine is that "a state that has persistently
objected to a rule of customary international law during
the course of the rule's emergence is not bound by the
rule." ' 69 While the persistent objector rule has rarely
been invoked,27 there is strong doctrinal support for
it.27 ' The doctrinal support proceeds from a positivist understanding of international law and stresses that while a
state might acquiesce to a new custom through its silence,
it cannot be bound if it conspicuously rejects the emergent

custom.'27

The United States has been the most vocal state in
maintaining the political/legal distinction in OSCE commitments. It has gone beyond relying on the language of
OSCE documents and independently opposed the legalization of OSCE commitments.273 Even if a court were willing to find that OSCE commitments have become binding
as custom because of the mandatory language of OSCE

266. See generally Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer:
The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 457 (1985) (describing doctrine of persistent objector); Adam Steinfeld,
Note, Nuclear Objections: The Persistent Objector and the Legality of the Use
of Nuclear Weapons, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1635, 1646-58 (1996) (describing
doctrine of persistent objector).
267. See Asylum, supra note 167, 277-78. "But even if it could be supposed
that such a custom existed between certain Latin-American States only, it could
not be invoked against Peru which, far from having by its attitude adhered to
it, has, on the contrary, repudiated it." Id.
268. See Fisheries (U.K. v. Norway), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (Dec. 18). Stating that "[clonsequently, the ten-mile rule has not acquired the authority of a
general rule of international law. In any event the ten-mile rule would appear
to be inapplicable as against Norway inasmuch as she has always opposed any
attempt to apply it to the Norwegian coast." Id.
269. See Stein, supra note 266, at 457.
'270. See Stein, supra note 266, at 459-63.
271. See Stein, supra note 266, at 459; Steinfeld, supra note 266, at 1646.
272. See Stein, supra note 266, at 459.
273. See BASic DOCUMENTS 1993-1995, supra note 69, at xix (noting that
efforts by OSCE states to legalize OSCE commitments have failed because of
opposition by United States).
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documents, the U.S. could argue that it is exempt from
that custom because it has persistently and independently
stated that it will not be legally bound by those commitments. So few actual uses of the persistent objector rule
have occurred that it is not clear how often and how
clearly the United States must publicly state its intention
not to be bound to preserve its objection.274 Trying to
predict how an international court would treat the persistent
objector rule, if a case actually turned on it, is mere
speculation.
Due to the ambiguity surrounding the persistent objector
doctrine, another problem arises: securing a forum to
decide the issue. The OSCE has an adjudicative body, the
treaty-based Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, but the
U.S. has refused to ratify the Convention on Conciliation
and Arbitration within the OSCE.275 The ICJ is also unavailable as a forum, in part because Native American
groups cannot be parties before the International Court of
Justice.276 Another state could try to raise the issue before the ICJ on behalf of a Native American tribe, 2" but
even then, the United States would have to consent to
specific jurisdiction since the U.S. no longer recognizes the
ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction. There are no easily available
international forums that could resolve the legal status of
OSCE rights.
Native American groups could be parties before U.S.
courts, but US courts are unlikely to recognize the customary nature of OSCE commitments on their own initiative.
The status of customary international law in U.S. courts
remains an extremely complicated and ambiguous matter,
but what follows is a brief look at some of the problems.
As a matter of international law, custom and treaties have
the same place in the hierarchy of sources of law, both

274. See Steinfeld, supra note 266, at 1651-53 (discussing persistence requirement of defense).
275. See BASIC DOCUMENTS 1993-1995, supra note 69, at xix (discussing reluctance of United States to ratify treaty because it would be step towards
'legalizing' OSCE commitments).
276. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 34, para. I
(elucidating that "[o]nly states may be parties in cases before the Court").
277. Canada is the most likely candidate since it has a sizable Native American population. But see infra note 296 and accompanying text.
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being principle sources of international law.27
It is not
clear from a textual interpretation of the United States'
Constitution, however, that customs share the same position
as treaties in U.S. law.279 The Constitution makes it clear
that treaties are part of the "supreme Law of the
Land," 2" but makes no mention of international custom
in the Supremacy Clause.
Nevertheless, there are cases which conclude that international custom is part of the domestic law of the United
States. In The Paquete Habana,"' the Supreme Court
held that an international custom was part of the law of
the United States.282 That very same case, however,
raised doubts about the position of custom within the
domestic legal hierarchy.2 3 In a more recent case, the
Supreme Court noted in passing that "United States courts
apply international law as a part of our own in appropriate
circumstances," 2" while suggesting that courts could decline to render decisions on claims of customary international law because of the difficulty of ascertaining the
content of international custom and the possibility of inter285
fering in U.S. foreign policy.
2
Despite the confusion, in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
the
Second Circuit found a customary norm of international

278. See VILLIGER, supra note 174, at 57-59, paras. 84-86; Michael
Akehurst, The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 273, 275 (1974-75); Karol Wolfke, Treaties and Custom: Aspects of
Interrelation, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 31, 36 (Jan Klabbers &
Rene Lefeber eds., 1998).
279. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith I1, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 32021 (1997) (discussing text of Constitution).
280. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
281. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
282. See id. at 686-700 (holding that by "ancient usage among civilized nations" which had "gradually ripenjed] into a rule of international law," coastal
fishing vessels were exempt from capture as prizes of war).
283. See id. at 700 (stating that "where there is no treaty, and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations"). The Paquete Habana relegates custom
to a fallback source of law, only usable in the absence of a treaty or some domestic pronouncement. See id.
284. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964)
(citing The Paquete Habana as authority).
285. See id. at 428.
286. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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law prohibiting state-sponsored torture,287 and concluded
that federal courts have jurisdiction over violations of that
norm under the Alien Tort Claims Act. 28 As the Alien
Tort Claims Act289 expressly contemplates a remedy for
violations of "the law of nations," it remains unclear
whether a U.S. court could suigenerously provide a remedy
for a violation of customary international law. If a court
were to follow The Paquete Habana, then a remedy might
be available but only upon a showing that the issue has
not been addressed by any treaty or domestic pronouncement.
The question of the status of customary international law
in US courts remains an unresolved one, and the academic
debate is both extensive and sharply divided. 29' The issue
is far too complicated to adequately address here. The
complexity and uncertainty of the status of international
custom in U.S. courts, combined with the hostility of those
courts to claims based upon international human rights, 9
would make any attempt to bring alleged violations of
OSCE minority rights a difficult, protracted and probably
unsuccessful venture. Even if U.S. courts were willing to
find a rule of customary international law and craft a
remedy, the U.S. might raise the "persistent objector" defense. 2' The outlook for a legal determination of Native
American rights under the OSCE, whether in an international or domestic forum, appears bleak.

287. See id. at 884.
288. See id. at 889.
289. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
290. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 279 (arguing that international human rights norms should not be treated as part of federal law); Ryan
Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing.: International Human
Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997) (supporting decision in Filartiga); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393
(1997). These articles merely scratch the surface of the debate, and contain references to other articles.
291. See generally John Quigley, Human Rights Defenses in US Courts, 20
HUM. RTS. Q. 555 (1998) (discussing recent cases and concluding that U.S.
courts have been extremely reluctant to give effect to even treaty-based human
rights).
292. See supra notes 266-72 and accompanying text.
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D. Political Implementation

While the chances of a legal determination of OSCE
rights remain small, non-legal implementation mechanisms
exist within the OSCE which might benefit Native American groups. The Berlin Mechanism could be used to call
an emergency session of the Senior Council to discuss the
situation of Native Americans. The Moscow Mechanism
could be activated to force the United States to accept a
mission of rapporteurs to investigate and report on the
implementation of national minority rights. Consensus Minus One would allow the condemnation of U.S. violations
with or without the consent of the United States. All of
these implementation mechanisms could bring the issue to
the attention of other OSCE states and the public, thereby
focusing public scrutiny on the United States' failure to
live up to its OSCE commitments.
Unfortunately, none of these implementation mechanisms
are likely to be employed against the United States. The
major stumbling block is that they all need to be initiated
by another OSCE state. National minority issues in the
OSCE have been pushed primarily by "kin-states."293 Kinstates exist where the national minority in one OSCE state
is the dominant majority in another OSCE state and that
dominant majority seeks to protect the interests of its kinminority. For instance, Hungary has followed the situation
of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, while Slovakia has
followed the situation of the Slovakian minority in Hungary 29" Similar kin-state bonds can be seen in the correspondence between the HCNM and the governments of
Greece and Albania. 295 There is no Native American state
that could promote the implementation of national minority
rights in the United States. Mexico is not an OSCE state,
and while Canada has a considerable Native American
population, it does not have the same motivation to protect
Native Americans in the United States as a kin-state would
have.2 The reality is that the general human rights im293. See Estebanez, supra note 129, at 139-40 (describing role of kin-state
bonds).
294. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
296. Indeed, because Canada has a sizable Native American minority of its
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plementation mechanisms are unlikely to be activated to
investigate U.S. compliance with its national minority rights
commitments.
The High Commissioner, independent of OSCE states,
can receive information from almost any source. This
suggests that Native American groups, presenting evidence
to the High Commissioner, would result in the use of the
HCNM's travel and fact-finding powers in the United
States. The High Commissioner can foreclose this possibility by mandate. The High Commissioner does not represent an express advocate of national minority rights but an
"instrument of conflict prevention." 2" The High Commissioner investigates the implementation of national minority
rights as a method of conflict prevention, and no plausible
argument exists that the United States' failure to fully
implement national minority rights for Native Americans
will lead to conflict. The HCNM will not intervene to
investigate U.S. compliance.2 98
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper set out to determine whether OSCE national
minority rights would benefit national minorities in . the
United States. As Part VI indicates, although OSCE minority rights will probably not be applied in the United States
in the near future, the OSCE is not a failure. It contributed to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and
made the difficult transition to a post-Cold War organization. In the last ten years, the OSCE has developed collective minority rights that go beyond the individual rights
found in most human rights instruments. Notably, in addition to collective rights, the OSCE has developed several
useful implementation mechanisms including the office of
High Commissioner on National Minorities. The HCNM
has been helpful in shaping national minority policy among
own, it may be reluctant to raise the legal status of OSCE national minority
rights in North America. If OSCE minority rights are legally binding in the
United States, then they would seem to be legally binding in Canada as well.
Consequently, Canada may oppose any attempt to determine the legal status of
OSCE minority rights in the United States.
297. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text.
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Eastern European states, and a general consensus seems to
exist that the High Commissioner is a success.
Yet, it remains unlikely that OSCE minority rights will
be applied in the United States. Rather than a failure, this
is simply a consequence of the OSCE's purpose. The
collapse of communism revealed ethnic tensions that had
been suppressed under Soviet rule. When conflicts broke
out across Eastern Europe, the OSCE changed from a
Cold War security conference into an organization dedicated to conflict prevention and management. As part of that
transition, the OSCE developed a body of minority rights.
Minority rights in the OSCE are a means to an end, not
an end in themselves. National minority rights are a method of preventing ethnic conflict. Although this is most
apparent in the mandate of the High Commissioner on
National Minorities, it permeates the entire OSCE. Until
minority rights become an end in themselves, Western
democracies are not likely to apply them vigorously.
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